Tenant-scoped authority
Verified identity + active membership + RLS; request tenant/role values grant no authority.
Security & trust
Identity, tenant authorization, invoice data, provider secrets, and evidence use separate fail-closed controls.
Identity & tenant
identity · membership · RLS
Invoice data
encryption · retention · purge
Evidence
bounded output · no payload
Request-supplied tenant or role values do not create authority.
Enforced controls
Controls are not collapsed into one blanket claim: identity, isolation, encryption, retention, secrets, and evidence remain independently inspectable.
Identity & authority
Who can act, in which tenant, and with what authority.
Verified identity + active membership + RLS; request tenant/role values grant no authority.
Secure, HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict server session with bounded CSRF authority.
Short-lived, single-use invites; an invite never grants owner authority.
Data lifecycle
How invoice bytes are encrypted, retained, and purged.
Invoice bytes encrypted outside PostgreSQL and excluded from logs and share-safe evidence.
Encrypted retention capped at one hour; purge state remains auditable.
Secrets & evidence
What stays isolated and what may leave as evidence.
Provider secrets use separate encrypted custody; plaintext secrets stay out of evidence.
Evidence excludes payloads; export/deletion requests remain subject to retention controls.
Trust & data reference
Each reference separates what is actually enforced from what is unpublished or must not be read as a certification claim.
Hosted access is tenant-scoped.
Provider credentials stay outside public metadata.
Share-safe evidence uses bounded identifiers and hashes.
Full note
This product page describes implemented technical data-handling boundaries only; it is not presented as a complete GDPR privacy notice. InvoiceRig minimizes public exposure of personal data and protected invoice content: hosted access is tenant-scoped, provider credentials stay outside public metadata, and share-safe evidence uses bounded technical identifiers and hashes. No operator, controller, retention-period, data-subject contact, or statutory disclosure is invented on this public surface when that authority is not defined in the repository.
Organization admins can record export requests.
Owners can record deletion requests.
Recording a request does not itself export, purge, archive, or delete data.
Full note
InvoiceRig's implemented customer-data controls are tenant-scoped and deletion must be enforced server-side through the retention and purge boundary rather than by hiding data in the browser. Authenticated organization admins can record export requests and owners can record deletion requests in hosted Settings; these records do not themselves export, purge, archive, or delete data. support@invoicerig.com is the verified response destination for privacy, security and data-rights requests. The public surface still does not invent unverified statutory controller identity or registered-address details.
Tenant access is membership-validated and runtime database roles do not bypass RLS.
Logs, evidence, recovery bundles, and provider credentials have separate boundaries.
Real customer invoice upload uses the reviewed encrypted production path with managed custody, bounded retention and auditable purge controls.
Full note
Implemented controls include membership-validated tenant access, non-BYPASSRLS runtime database roles, bounded logs and evidence, encrypted recovery bundles, and isolated credential custody. Real customer invoice upload uses the reviewed production path with encrypted object storage, managed key custody, bounded retention and auditable purge controls; provider execution derives tenant authority from live job leases and this page does not convert sandbox behavior into a certification claim.